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1. Introduction: Puzzle
Howmuchof a shift has takenplace inGermany’s policies
on the structure, rules, and institutions of the Eurozone?
What kind of impact have German preferences had on
the 2020 negotiations over the EU budget and the com-
plementary Recovery and Resilience Facility (henceforth,
the Rescue Plan)? How should its collaboration with
France over these issues best be understood? And how
is Germany’s stance likely to evolve into the future?
Germany’s relaxation of its role as anchor of the sin-
gle currency and proponent of fiscal discipline was sig-
nificant in mid-2020, bringing it closer to France and
Southern European positions supporting common debt
and fiscal capacity. One notable result of this relaxation
was support for a joint initiative with France for tem-
porary intergovernmental financial transfers designed to
offset some of the costs of fighting the Covid-19 pan-
demic. The plan envisaged five hundred billion euros of
grants to be distributed across the EU, financed through
the issuance of common debt, a measure that previ-
ous German governments had refused to contemplate
on principle. This borrowing and redistribution would
come on top of another €250 billion raised by the
European Commission and lent to the member states,
as well as loans organized by the European Investment
Bank which were already earmarked for investment in
greener and more cohesive economic activity (European
Investment Bank, 2021). Finally, in this context, the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) also stood ready to
loan money in addition to the EU’s budget and borrow-
ing capacity. All told, the €750 billion increase in the EU’s
budget significantly increased EU capacity from just over
€1 trillion to over €1,8 trillion, not including funds avail-
able through the European Investment Bank.
This development is striking in light of Germany’s
unwillingness to contemplate either borrowing or trans-
fers, or even a contribution-based increase of the EU’s
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budget as recently as early 2020, and well into the first
few months of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the vol-
ume of grants was negotiated down to €390 billion in
July 2020 and transfers came into question, this opposi-
tion came from a small coalition led by the Netherlands
rather than Germany itself. While these developments
cannot be considered German support for a Hamiltonian
moment of European fiscal federalism, they cross the
Rubicon of fiscal transfers between states and com-
mon debt for the first time. This makes it a significant
change in Germany’s Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) policy.
Given Germany’s historical opposition to transfers
and common debt, I ask whether this constitutes a trans-
formation that will outlast the Covid-19 crisis, or a tem-
porary deviation similar to that of 2004–2005. Although
Germany is not the only country that matters in the tra-
jectory of the Eurozone, it is decisive in which directions
EMU can develop in response to challenges. EU agree-
ments on Covid-19 response, and their budgetary impli-
cations pose more than one puzzle. How was a shift in
Germany’s position possible? How do we account for
the timing, specifically the rapid shift in May 2020, given
the continuity of Germany’s stance on EMU rules before-
hand? And how much of a change is this likely to entail?
This article seeks to answer these questions by
focusing on the ideational positions of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic
Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parties, with
attention to selected leadership and public opinion
allies in particular, supplemented by public opinion
data. It focuses on the opportunities and constraints
in Germany for the Finance Minister to bring about
a shift in the country’s macroeconomic policy stance
on EMU, including the issue of EU financial transfers.
The implications for the durability of Germany’s rap-
prochement with France over the basics of EMU mem-
bership and its overall priorities after a longer period
of estrangement between the two countries will then
be considered. The article’s primary conclusion, which
it demonstrates below, is that Germany’s voters and
popular CDU/CSU parties will remain significant forces
for fiscal restraint in the future, both at the national
and European levels. This is seen in the parameters
and conditions attached to the Rescue Plan, and in dis-
course overwhat happenswhen the existing plan expires.
Depending on broader EU economic and political devel-
opments (whether the Eurozone comes under tremen-
dous strain once the Rescue Plan expires), Germany can
be expected to either block its extension (assuming lit-
tle stress) or attach further conditions to its lending pro-
grams (if stress resumes). This article contributes to the
literature on German preferences in EMU and its role
in EMU politics. It begins by assessing the state of the
literature regarding German preferences and negotia-
tion strategies in EMU, which largely matches the record
through March of 2018, and then moves on to assess
how much change has occurred since then and why.
2. Framework and Case Design
Within the literature on EMU development and EU
integration, large innovations naturally attract neofunc-
tional analyses in which form follows need (Niemann &
Ioannou, 2015), guided by EU institutions. It also attracts
intergovernmental analyses that emphasise disparities
in national positions and bargaining power coupled with
lowest common denominator voting systems to explain
the EU’s institutional output (Howarth & Quaglia, 2020).
The intergovernmental literature on EMU incorporates
not only distributional conflicts between haves and have-
nots, but also ideational divides that strengthen the dif-
ferences between them (Schäfer, 2016). In other words,
conflicts are not only about the transfer of resources, but
also whether such transfers are appropriate. This article
builds on the ideational analysis of EMU negotiations by
examining whether and to what degree German policy
ideas have changed as a result of the Covid-19 crisis.
This article hypothesises that national governments
able to reach stable international agreements are those
that hew closely to public preferences (Carrubba, 2001).
This prioritisation of domestic political preferences
forms the foundation of both liberal intergovernmental-
ist literature on institutional supply (Howarth & Quaglia,
2016, 2020) post-functionalist accounts of the impact
of identity, ideas, political saliency and constraining dis-
sensus of EU affairs (De Vries, 2007; Down & Wilson,
2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2009) and the kinds of out-
comes they entail, particularly weak de novo institu-
tions (Hodson & Puetter, 2019) or weak institutional
architectures and endogenous cycles of institutional
improvement (Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier, 2016; Kleine
& Pollack, 2018). Similarly, it shows up in analysis of
the impact of fiscal transfers on support for EU policy,
and for supranational agreements in general (Chalmers&
Dellmuth, 2015; Tallberg, Bäckstrand, & Scholte, 2018).
This leads to the expectation that heads of govern-
ment as political entrepreneurs will promote and pro-
tect positions that reflect political demand at home over
the medium to long term. In the case of German EMU
policy, this is reflected in strong promotion of institu-
tions that reduce risks at the national level, at the same
time that financial assistance mechanisms across coun-
tries remain underdeveloped (Donnelly, 2018a; Schoeller,
2020). At the same time, we look to determine howmuch
short-term policy entrepreneurship takes place in the
absence of strong domestic political demand, driven by
policy expertise and attempts to coordinate solutions that
manage the country’s interdependence with others on a
mutually voluntary basis. This domestic, national orienta-
tion can be falsified by looking at the actions of a German
Finance Minister who is broadly in agreement with a
classic neofunctional network of supranational (EU, IMF,
OECD) and transgovernmental institutions and actors.
To answer the questions posed above, this article
focuses on Germany’s domestic politics and its approach
to Eurozone budget negotiations in the period stretching
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from March 2018 until the fall of 2020. This start of
this time frame is chosen to coincide with the installa-
tion of a German Finance Minister from SPD with sym-
pathies for fiscal union between the Eurozone mem-
ber states, who simultaneously is embedded in a Grand
Coalition with conservative CDU/CSU. It is broken down
into three moments in which economic and political
conditions are markedly different: pre-Covid-19 crisis
(March 2018–March 2020), early Covid-19 crisis (March
2020–May 2020), and advanced Covid-19 crisis (May
2020–). Each period then analyses German positions
on common Eurozone responses to economic and polit-
ical need, through existing institutions and programs
(national structural adjustments buttressed where nec-
essary by ESM emergency loans), or through com-
mon debt and cross-border transfers. Contributions to
German policy are broken down into the positions of pol-
icy entrepreneurs (as elites), political parties, and voters,
taking into account domestic, transnational and intergov-
ernmental inputs.
The study starts by looking at the policy preferences
and initiatives of the SPD Finance Minister of Germany
and his second in command to advocate common debt
and transfers within the Eurozone, together with the
French and EU counterparts who supported such a shift.
It then looks at the policy preferences and actions of the
(CDU/CSU) party fraction which led the government and
opposed any movement in this direction until mid-2020.
Finally it covers the degree of public support for change
or continuity over common debt and transfers. Through
this, we can map German policy change, and ascertain
the ability of the various parties to effect lasting change
in EMU policy, and therefore institutions.
The literature on EMU development, German posi-
tions regarding fiscal transfers and the negotiations
dynamics between France and Germany show consis-
tencies over a longer period of time that underline
Germany’s deeply-seated domestic preferences for con-
servative monetary and fiscal policy (Hodson, 2017;
Howarth & Verdun, 2020). This pattern remains con-
sistent despite two concessions to French preferences
for more interventionist and activist fiscal policy that
can be attributed to the cognitive frameworks of indi-
vidual German Chancellors. Helmut Kohl is known to
have ensured that EMU proceeded despite concerns
about the enforcement of fiscal membership rules due
to Germany’s historical duty to support European inte-
gration. Later, Gerhard Schröder worked together with
France to introduce a relaxation of those rules in 2005.
In addition to these two cases, Angela Merkel is known
to have blocked attempts to push Greece out of the
Eurozone in 2012 and 2015 to preserve the unity of
the currency bloc. However, the original design of EMU,
including the Stability and Growth Pact, and analyses of
EMU negotiations since then rightly underline that polit-
ical parties, public opinion and interest groups remain
consistent in their rejection of common debt and cross-
border transfers.
The frame for analysing Germany’s domestic politi-
cal attitudes toward EU budgets, transfers, emergency
aid and repayment conditions starts with the ques-
tion of whether Germany’s parties and public respond
favourably to them or not. If we witness a broad shift in
thinking, then we should expect the new German posi-
tion to remain stable over time, and for Germany to sup-
port similar Franco-German compromises into the future.
If not, then we should expect the agreements to be of a
one-off nature that applies only to a singular crisis situa-
tion, to expire after the crisis has passed, and for prefer-
ences from the Schäuble era to reassert themselves after
the expiration of the current European Rescue Plan.
This article’s working hypothesis is that a meaningful
shift in Germaneconomic principles has taken place from
ordoliberalism to neokeynesianism at the level of the
German FinanceMinister, his senior staff and his political
party, and made visible by collaboration with French and
European officials in the introduction of the 2020 Rescue
Plan. At the same time, this shift is not fully shared by
CDU/CSU politicians, or in domestic society. They remain
committed to fiscal conservatism and expect Europe to
return to the pre-Covid-19 economic rules after the cri-
sis has abated. The weight of German political and pub-
lic opinion is felt further in the absence of any increased
public support for the SPD as a result of this policy shift.
Overall, this speaks more to a temporary life span of the
2020 agreements, based on the expected tendency of
major political parties to reflect societal demands unless
a more fundamental disruption of the economy leads
public opinion to review its ideational commitments.
This article proceeds as follows. It first reviews briefly
the pre-2018 configuration of people, doctrines and insti-
tutions for the single currency to lay out the political and
institutional landscape inherited by the actors around
the table. It then moves to examine plans and negotia-
tions in the period between March of 2018 and March
of 2020, covering the rise of mutually supportive French
and German finance ministers dealing with the prospect
of a Eurozone budget. This is the potential neofunc-
tional moment which did not come to fruition. In the
penultimate section the article examines the period from
April 2020 onward to underline the impact of Covid-19-
induced changes on German, French, Dutch and Italian
politics, and therefore the prospects for a Eurozone
budget. We then conclude with observations about the
dynamics involved that explain these developments.
3. Pre-2018: People, Interests, Doctrines and
Institutions
Germany’s politicians, voters and key opinion mak-
ers have been fairly consistent about their ordolib-
eral macroeconomic policy preferences since the plan-
ning days of the single currency. The exception was
2004–2005, when the Schröder government moved
with the Chirac administration in France, and then the
entire ECOFIN Council, to set aside the Excessive Deficit
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Procedure and introducemedium-term budgetary objec-
tives. Even then, however, the hold of ordoliberal princi-
ples is visible in Germany’s SPD government instituting
harsh structural adjustment reforms (Hartz IV) that coun-
teracted any notion of broader political ‘wetness’ on
social and fiscal policy. After the Schröder government
left office in November 2005, three coalition govern-
ments followed under Angela Merkel that restored and
pushed for the export of orthodox/ordoliberal macroe-
conomic principles across Eurozone member states,
and EU budget oversight mechanisms to strengthen
those demands (Otero-Iglesias, 2017). This owed a great
deal to the shift of SPD under Finance Minister Peer
Steinbrück (2005–2009) away from Keynesian demand
stimulus and toward bipartisan consensus on budget
retrenchment. This position left the German Green
Party as the only champion of a more social macroe-
conomic policy, and intergovernmental transfers within
Europe. With agreement between the CDU/CSU and
SPD that Germany should reject fiscal union for EMU,
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (2009–2017) could
uphold this position throughout the next grand coali-
tion (2009–2013), and the conservative-liberal coalition
(2013–2018) that followed it. At the European and
national levels across Europe, budgets were to be bal-
anced (Schuldenbremse), and economies (re)structured
to ensure price levels remain stable or move downward
(focus on external competitiveness rather than domes-
tic demand). Similarly, the EU budget was to remain lim-
ited. The strength of this imperative was tested after
the Brexit referendum of 2016 led some other member
states and EU institutions to call for a larger EU budget
(“Schaeuble eyes,” 2016). Throughout this long period of
stewardship, Schäuble’s steadfast position on European
questions was rewarded with unwavering support from
party and voters alike (“Politico poll of polls,” 2020).
Bremer (2020) also notes that the SPD unreservedly
adopted the same positions on fiscal conservatism from
that period on.
Schäuble’s hawkish positions on EU budget size and
on fiscal transfers set the tone for conditional cooper-
ation with French politicians during his tenure. France
had no meaningful impact on this stance. Rather, French
governments varied in their willingness to work together
with their German counterparts on EMU. France’s politi-
cians, voters and key opinion makers have consistently
supported a more interventionist macroeconomic pol-
icy strategy, although each administration chose its own
tactics on how to engage with Germany. The conserva-
tive Sarkozy government (2007–2012) worked together
with Germany to establishmacroeconomic policy surveil-
lance and downplayed the fiscal union demands of its
predecessors, while the socialist Hollande government
(2012–2017) lobbied hard for fiscal union and relaxation
of surveillance in the European Semester without much
effect (Schild, 2013). Even a joint statement between
French FinanceMinister EmmanuelMacron and German
Minister for Economics and Energy Sigmar Gabriel sup-
porting transfers at the zenith of the 2015 conflict
between Germany and Greece within the Eurozone
(Gabriel & Macron, 2015) fell on barren ground as
Schäuble pressed the imperative of national budgetary
and structural adjustments, and the destructive moral
hazard effect of transfers on necessary reform efforts
(Schild, 2020). The liberal Macron government (May
2017–) found its own mix of supporting ordoliberal
macroeconomic surveillance and structural reforms with
more Keynesian proposals to establish a Eurozone bud-
get. This proposal hoped to secure a transactional quid
pro quo between French demands for greater collective
budgeting, and German demands for greater structural
reforms at the national level.
Howarth and Schild (2017) contend the Banking
Union era from 2012 allowed France to advance propos-
als for embedded liberalism, in which market forces are
softened with state intervention mechanisms. The suc-
cesses they point to were the establishment of the
European Financial Stability Facility as a crisis manage-
ment tool (already from 2010) and the establishment,
albeit formally, of amore symmetricmacroeconomic pol-
icy recommendation framework in the Macroeconomic
Imbalances Procedure in 2011. Certainly there is German
and French collaboration on these institutional innova-
tions under France’s Sarkozy government, but if we were
to try to measure embedded liberalism as the presence
of macroeconomic shock absorbers, or of countercycli-
cal macroeconomic intervention (fiscal stimulus during
downturns, whether broad or targeted to promote sun-
rise industries, inclusivity and greening of the economy),
we would not find evidence to support any meaning-
ful influence of French ideas about macroeconomic pol-
icy along the lines of an EU budget or a new rule struc-
ture that gives national governmentsmore fiscal room to
manoeuvre. The European Financial Stability Facility, and
the ESM that followed it, provide loans attached to con-
ditions stipulating budget retrenchment and structural
adjustments. They act as an emergency intervention to
keep the single currency from falling apart, but have
impacts that are incompatible with the mainstreaming
of social protection that we understand under embed-
ded liberalism.
Rather, the ESM is better understood as an institu-
tion that balances Chancellor Merkel’s concern to hold
the Eurozone together and Schäuble’s concern for fiscal
responsibility—a balance that is visible in the Eurozone’s
relationship to Greece in 2015. Pressure on national
governments was increased, but not allowed to eject a
member state. Similarly, theMacroeconomic Imbalances
Procedure adopted in 2011, while opening the door to
hypothetical critique of large current account surpluses
in Germany and the Netherlands, or wildly inflated pri-
vate debt levels, remains asymmetrical in application,
focusing on country-specific recommendations for coun-
tries with public budget deficits and current account
deficits, along with attention paid to the enforcement of
such recommendations through the introduction of the
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reverse qualified majority vote for the Excessive Deficit
Procedure. These institutional innovations are indeed
best understood as the product of selective Franco-
German cooperation during the Sarkozy administration
that focused on Eurozone system maintenance, rather
than on Franco-German compromises on the budgetary
and fiscal matters that France supported (Brunnermeier,
James, & Landau, 2018; Degner & Leuffen, 2020; Lehner
& Wasserfallen, 2019; Notermans & Piattoni, 2020).
Degner and Leuffen (2020) underline that this was not
dual leadership, but German. The limits were visible in
France’s failure to secure German support on a series
of support mechanisms, including a more robust finan-
cial intervention role for the European Financial Stability
Facility, and subsequently the ESM (Howarth & Schild,
2017, p. 185).
German imperviousness to French and other
European demands were also visible in the outright hos-
tility of Franco-German relations during the Hollande
administration, which advocated directly for fiscal union
and tried to gather together a coalition of countries to
support its demands, but to no avail. 2011–2013 was a
period in which Italy’s technocratic Monti government
and Spain’s conservative Rajoy government were adopt-
ing ordoliberal prescriptions for budget cuts, structural
reforms and toning down long-standing interest in fis-
cal union creation to secure renewed access to finan-
cial markets (Donnelly, 2018a). It was also a period of
polarisation between Germany and the governments of
Cyprus and Greece, in which the latter’s demands for
fiscal transfers poisoned the well for French and Italian
arguments then and thereafter (through mid-2018: see
the centre-left Italian Letta, Renzi and Gentiloni admin-
istrations, as well as the Conte administrations that
followed). This growing gap is mirrored by strong sup-
port for Germany’s stance by successive Dutch coalition
governments led by Liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte
from 2011. As in Germany, budget discipline and rejec-
tion of EU budget enlargement or fiscal union enjoyed
sustained and unquestioned cross-party support, with
the exception of the Dutch Greens. In sum, the situa-
tion Olaf Scholz inherited in March 2018 in no way sup-
ported the development of a Eurozone budget, even if
his reported preferences lay in that direction.
4. March 2018–March 2020: People, Interests,
Doctrines and Institutions
March 2018 is a relevant inflection point to contrast
with the time periods preceding and following because
it is the moment that brings a German Finance Minister
into office with sympathies for fiscal union of some
sort, and with links to counterparts in the French gov-
ernment with the potential to support and shape his
proposals. And yet, a new political desire to introduce
a larger Eurozone budget failed to translate into con-
crete achievements on this front, given the lack of
support from conservatives, and voters and his own
SPD, which remained divided and focused on internal
German politics at the expense of EU affairs. Olaf Scholz,
mayor of Hamburg and member of the party’s techno-
cratic/conservative wing, took up the position of Finance
Minister within Angela Merkel’s grand coalition govern-
ment between the SPD and CDU/CSU.
Scholz’s position within his own party, as well as
the electoral fate of the party, and internal party pol-
itics proved relevant for shaping what kind of propos-
als were worked on and brought forward during this
period. As outlined above, the SPD up until this point had
rejected the idea of a sizeable EU or EMU federal bud-
get, and had hewed to Germany’s mainstream conser-
vative voters in their rejection of such proposals rather
than adopting a profile distinct from that of the CDU/CSU
(Bremer, 2020). But this strategy had not resulted in
electoral success—the party remained persistently weak
in the polls—and over time, led to increasing divisions
within the party and voter migration to other parties as
well. Advocates of greater European cooperation moved
to the Green Party, which advocated a fiscal union of
some kind and grew in importance in the Bundestag,
but was relegated to the political opposition through
this entire period. Conservative opponents of economic
assistance to financially fragile Eurozone member states,
meanwhile, launched judicial challenges to the European
Central Bank assistance for Southern Europe (Saurugger
& Fontan, 2019).
This centrist position led to problems within Scholz’s
own party, and hence hampered any ambitions he may
have had to reshape domestic or European institutions.
This was not just a question of uncertainty, but rather
of internal division. In response to the Party’s contin-
ued electoral decline, the membership’s left wing began
demanding a stronger domestic and European policy
shift which the centrists found untenable, and even trou-
blesome for legal reasons, given the country’s constitu-
tional ban on deficit spending (Karremans, 2020). Until
August 2020, left and right cohorts within the party
collided over the question of whether the 2005 deci-
sion to adopt ordoliberal prescriptions for austerity and
structural adjustment in search of mainstream electoral
support was a good move (in the sense of being a nec-
essary evil to restore and maintain economic competi-
tiveness and stable state finances) or not. To this ques-
tion was added whether Germany should share financial
burdens with other countries in Europe by supporting
EU-level transfers and schemes. Younger party members
and activists supported a shift away from ordoliberal-
ism and the Schuldenbremse domestically, but remained
relatively silent on European economic policy (Grunden,
Janetzki, & Salandi, 2017).
This division was felt in December 2019 when the
extra-parliamentary party, which is responsible for over-
all policy and strategy, moved to the political left. At the
time, the SPD rejected Scholz as (non-parliamentary)
party leader, and refused to name him as the party’s
(parliamentary) candidate for Chancellor in the next
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election. The party selected instead a duo representing
the centre- and left-wing cohorts of the party: Norbert
Walter-Borjans, the centrist, was the former premier of
North-Rhine Westphalia, and Saskia Esken, the left-wing
leader, agitated for a break with the CDU, a shift to
a more pro-social stance, an alliance with the Green
Party, and possibly with anti-capitalist and anti-EU party
Die Linke (The Left Party; “SPD candidate,” 2019). This
strong pull from the party leadership and membership
for a sharp shift to the left raised important questions as
well regarding the SPD’s commitment to the EU overall,
including a larger Eurozone budget.While this shift to the
left might have given Scholz support for a common bud-
get in principle, the manner in which the SPD was tear-
ing itself apart over economic and European policy did
not result in either policy wins or electoral gains. Public
support for the SPD, which had been in steady decline for
years, did not recover as a result of this shift. CDU voters
remained loyal to their party, even as an evolving leader-
ship contest to succeed Chancellor Merkel faltered with
declining support for her designated successor, Annegret
Kramp-Karrenbauer. She led the party from 2018 but
resigned in February 2020.
At the same time as this conflict was playing out,
Franco-German interaction on the prospect of a fiscal
union for the entire EU or a Eurozone budget for those
member states progressed quietly and slowly at the trans-
governmental and intergovernmental levels. At the trans-
governmental level, Scholz’s right hand man, Jörg Kukies,
worked with his counterpart in the French Ministry of
Finance, Odile Renaud-Basso to devise plans for a work-
able improvement of the EU/Eurozone fiscal framework
(Florence School of Banking and Finance, 2020).
Not much is known from transgovernmental doc-
uments about how far the overlap between the two
sides went, but the intergovernmental level between
President Macron and Chancellor Merkel tells us a great
deal. The Meseberg Declaration of June 2018 was the
result of a bilateral discussion between the two lead-
ers, in which the topic of an EU budget was recog-
nised as a topic of negotiation, without explicitly com-
mitting to such an outcome. But the negotiations did
not favour France. This is demonstrated in the whittling
down of Macron’s Eurozone budget and fiscal union pro-
posals into the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence
and Competitiveness on the basis of German objections,
which reinforced the structural adjustment and fiscal
responsibility mantras of the existing European financial
stability architecture, and the central role of the ESM
in holding that system together in emergencies rather
than EU funds (Schoeller, 2020). Later, in mid-2020, infor-
mation from the two Finance Ministry representatives
(below) will demonstrate that the negotiation is one
of how to establish common measures that will sat-
isfy financial markets (Florence School of Banking and
Finance, 2020).
Outside of the central Franco-German relationship,
the increasingly loud demands for fiscal union from Italy
and the contrary demands for national responsibility
from the Netherlands seemed to cancel each other out.
This is visible as the Netherlands led a New Hanseatic
League of small, Northern, fiscally conservative states
afraid of Germany relaxing its insistence on EU frugal-
ity in its talks with France, and as the populist Conte
I government in Italy insisted on transfers, each hew-
ing to their own national publics (Hix, 2018; Matthijs &
Merler, 2019).
Discussions at the 17–21 February 2020 Council
meeting, before the pandemic spread across Europe,
proved inconclusive. French and German negotiations
had progressed under the radar, but their own domes-
tic and international environments remained unchanged.
Within the CDU, which had just lost an interim leader
committed to the EU’s status quo, none of the con-
tenders to succeed Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer yet
envisaged moving toward a Eurozone budget.
5. April 2020 and the Aftermath
The Covid-19 lockdown drove Germany’s government to
introduce successive rounds of targeted domestic eco-
nomic stimulus funded by borrowingwith bipartisan sup-
port (Kluth, 2020), and provided an opportunity for the
Finance Ministry to discuss a common position on EU
budgetary instruments with France through May, and
then take those plans to the European level. Temporarily
breaking the sanctity of the Schuldenbremse domesti-
callymade these other initiatives possible, but the conse-
quences for Europe remained contested within German
parties, particularly within the SPD and the CDU/CSU.
In promoting EU stimulus, the government enjoyed
tenuous but sufficient support. The SPD’sWalter-Borjans
supported EU assistance arrangements to be made
swiftly and practically, while dealing with more funda-
mental problems later. This meant starting with the ESM
as an existing instrument of solidarity among equals, but
without ‘humiliating’ conditions that imposed hardship
typical of ESM loans in the past (Carbajosa, 2020). The
Greens went further, arguing that the ESM’s tainted his-
tory demanded EU initiative based on grants instead (Hill,
2020). The SPD’s Esken chimed in to support the Green
proposal (Esken, 2020; Fritz, 2020). In other words, the
SPD remained divided on the issue of support for grants
to other member states, and a larger EU budget to do
that. Bremer (2020) describes this as the party lacking a
policy paradigm to bring to voters and apply to policy.
Fromwithin the CDUmeanwhile, Armin Laschet, gov-
ernor of the country’s most populous state of North-
Rhine Westphalia and then candidate to replace Merkel
in the party’s upcoming leadership elections, announced
in April the necessity of a larger EU budget financed by
contributions (rather than borrowing), akin to aMarshall
Plan to combat the crisis, coupled with measures to
repay once the crisis was over (“Laschet verlangt,” 2020).
Although Laschet would only be confirmed as Chancellor
candidate in January 2021, this statement is meaningful
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for the resonance it gained with party members and
the broader electorate, which found the position appeal-
ing. Ironically, it placed the CDU in a more pro-Europe,
pro-EU-budget and interventionist position than the SPD
could definitively claim at that moment.
The CDU/CSU finally showed full support for grants
and borrowing in mid-May, after Chancellor Merkel
and President Macron proposed a €500 billion pro-
gram of grants to be borrowed by the EU during the
2020–2027 budget and repaid collectively by the EU in
the 2027–2034 budget. Insisting that Germany only pros-
pers when Europe prospers, Merkel won support from
CDU/CSU parliamentarians at home and in the European
Parliament, and from Wolfgang Schäuble as well to set
aside rejection of deficit spending, and grants at the EU
level (Hill, 2020). Only Friedrich Merz, who unsuccess-
fully competed to succeedMerkel as CDUChancellor can-
didate with support from the right, neoliberal wing of
the party, railed against transfers along with the oppo-
sition liberals (Free Democratic Party) and the xenopho-
bic, anti-EU right-wing party Alternative for Germany
(Rinke, 2020).
Once the announcement had beenmade, Kukies and
Renaud-Basso outlined the details of their project in
an online event on 22 June 2020 with the European
University Institute’s Florence School of Banking and
Finance (2020). They outlined their common strat-
egy of targeted economic stimulus aimed at improv-
ing future economic performance. Collective European
investments would be subject to these conditions, both
through EU grants and loans backed by collective debt
and ESM loans, with the former used more frequently
for the first time. This reflected their shared domes-
tic imperatives to ensure money supported a greener,
more inclusive and more productive economy in the pro-
cess. While Renaud-Basso underlined strategic invest-
ment, Kukies stressed that the plan had been designed
in such a way as to underline the credibility of spend-
ing strategies to financial markets (Florence School of
Banking and Finance, 2020). This meant that in tune
with previous critiques of crisis-driven public spending in
Greece and elsewhere, that a significant portion of the
money would be spent on transforming the economy to
meet future needs and generate future income, rather
than spending it on income support without any further
plans for economic development. The concrete implica-
tions of this can be seen in Commission and Council
agreement that alongside investments in health care sys-
tems which required upgrading in light of the shortcom-
ings revealed during the pandemic, that money would
also be directed toward future growth in digital trans-
formations and environmentally-friendly retrofitting of
economy, society and public administration.
Kukies acknowledged that the plan ducked the ques-
tion of the Hamiltonian moment of European fiscal
capacity, noting that their plan shelved that question to
a later date (Florence School of Banking and Finance,
2020). Instead, the focus would remain on the present,
and designing the Rescue Plan to promote a more highly
developed, productive, and resilient Europe in the near
future. The overall construction was designed to ensure
the EU could help badly hit economies, promote future
recovery, assuage Italian rejection of loans with condi-
tions attached, and push off Dutch (and more critical
German domestic) concerns about an EU federal bud-
get (below).
At the European level, the Franco-German announce-
ment preceded Commission proposals, butwas intended
to be incorporated into them in combination with the
Multiannual Financial Framework. In Council, the Frugal
Four (the Netherlands and Austria, with support from
Denmark and Sweden) supported the continued use of
the ESM for emergencies and opposed grants and col-
lective borrowing. They squared off against Germany,
France and the other member states until the last hours
of the 17–18 July summit, which they forced to extend
to 21 July (Rose & Nienaber, 2020). During this time,
the Four rejected grants outright until Sweden dropped
its opposition on 20 July, followed by Denmark and
Austria, leaving the Netherlands isolated. It achieved
fewer grants andmore loanswith (undefined) conditions,
and underlined the one-time nature of the measure.
In the Netherlands’ domestic justification of its eventual
support for economic assistance, these elements of pro-
ductivity enhancement and conditionality played signif-
icant parts of the government’s reasoning that every-
thing had been done to avert wasting money, laying the
groundwork for a future crisis and preventmaking future
transfers permanent. The plan would be a one-off mea-
sure (Tweede Kamer, 2020).
While the German and French proposals had not
been fully realised, the European agreement provided
a precedent for a shift on domestic and European bud-
getary policy on which future German politicians could
build, both on policy and on the basis of parliamentary
support. Here the statements of various CDU/CSU politi-
cians and opinion leaders shed light on where German
policy is likely to stand, given the party’s consistently
strong standing in voter opinion surveys, ahead of the
Green Party and the SPD in third place (Infratest Dimap,
2021). The party is also diverse in its views, but the
favoured policies remain clearly outlined.
The most positive support for the Rescue Plan came
from the former finance minister. Wolfgang Schäuble
took the position that the Plan was a good step to keep
the Eurozone together, and that a temporary relaxation
of the budget ruleswas appropriate, given the high levels
of debt required to stave off disaster. He also supported
some reform of the rules before reinstating them. This
put him in line with the European Commission, which
announced the use of the escape clause in the Excessive
Deficit Procedure. He did not go as far as to support
the European Fiscal Board’s call for a thorough discus-
sion and overhaul of the pact, particularly their strong
critique of the 60%ofGDP ceiling on public debt (Fleming
& Khan, 2020). Focusing on the effects of the fund,
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Schäuble maintained that a common strategy would be
crucial to whether the Fund works: How governments
spendwould be bound to determine success or failure of
stimulus. The EU should discuss common strategies for
funnelling investment into future productivity through
digitalisation, artificial intelligence, greening the econ-
omy and the like (Chazan, 2021a).
This was as far as the rest of the Party was pre-
pared to go in rethinking economic policy and law.
Top Merkel aide Helge Braun proposed scrapping the
country’s debt brake (Schuldenbremse) or shifting from
annual to multi-year exemptions in January 2021 (Braun,
2021). He reaped strong opposition within the CDU,
starting with the CDU’s General Secretary, Paul Ziemiak
and the party’s new Chancellor candidate Armin Laschet.
Zemiak demanded the debt brake be reinstalled by
2022 rather than later as Braun had suggested (Chazan,
2021b). Outside the party proper, Lars Feld, conserva-
tive economist and member of the country’s Council
of Economic Experts, attacked a constitutional amend-
ment required to repeal or change the Schuldenbremse
as a slippery slope to hollowing out the deficit brake.
Special exemptions would multiply and be hard to con-
trol (Seibel, 2021). Markus Söder, leader of the CDU’s
Bavarian sister party CSU, also rejected touching the law
(Finke, 2021). This animosity to changing economic pol-
icy principles extended equally to the EU’s plan. CSU
MEP Markus Feder railed against the inclusion of grants
entirely, expecting Italy to disregard conditions on loans
(Finke, 2021).
Meanwhile, the CDU’s candidate for Chancellor in
the 2021 elections (Armin Laschet) demonstrated sup-
port for targeted, temporary assistance but also a need
to return to pre-Covid-19 economic governance norms.
Laschet himself hadmade a point domestically that state
support for hospitals could only be used for corona-
related deficits, and had to be repaid as soon as the
pandemic was over. He also insisted on future budget
cuts and minimizing transfers out of Germany to protect
future generations from the burden of debt (“Laschet
fordert,” 2020). The fact that Laschet was responding
to deficit hawks in the state SPD party underlines the
conservative position of the centre in Germany’s most
populous state (“Laschet: Schulden für Rettungsschirm,”
2020). Given these policy positions, plus the fact that
the SPD show no sign of taking votes from either the
CDU or Greens (Infratest Dimap, 2021), there is reason
to believe these positions will dominate into the future.
Even advice from the European Central Bank to amend
the debt brake and the thinking behind it, most recently
from Isabel Schnabel, has fallen on deaf ears (Arnold,
2021; Donnelly, 2018b).
European policy, both within the EU and the
Eurogroup appear to follow this German concern with
repayment and return to ‘normal’ as well, also with
regard to timing. In early 2021, Scholz declared that
the EU should not rush to a decision while there was
still so much Covid-19-related uncertainty. Meanwhile,
Eurogroup President Donohoe simultaneously called for
a faster rollout of national plans to spend money, and
also to discuss the re-introduction of budget rules, and
the European Commission would consider a finite date
for returning to the Excessive Deficit Procedure, but not
until 2022 (Fleming, 2020, 2021). This hewed closer to
Germany’s position rather than that of France, which
argued that an exit date would damage the recovery.
Finance Minister Le Maire underlined that the Recovery
Fund was already proving too slow and complicated to
use to its full potential due to the requirement that
national governments draft plans on how to use the
funds and receive Commission approval before disburse-
ment (Mallet & Abboud, 2021).
6. Conclusions
This article demonstrates the politics of introducing EU
budgetary instruments and their alternatives to German
voters and party members in three time periods: dur-
ing the tenure of Wolfgang Schäuble, during that of
Olaf Scholz before the Covid-19 lockdown, and that of
Scholz in the context of the economic disruptions of
2020. Covid-19, combined with Merkel’s leadership, has
made it possible for the Germany and France to pro-
pose the Rescue Plan together by changing German polit-
ical discourse from scepticism to acceptance of a larger
EU budget, at least through 2024. Agreement on joint
borrowing to finance this is more tenuous however, as
the inclinations of the CDU/CSU’s red lines on the EU
budget demonstrate, and support for that party con-
firm. The freshly anointed CDU Chancellor candidate
campaigned in 2021 on a program that envisaged a larger
EU budget in the future (presumably from 2027, once
the current Multiannual Framework runs out), but with
greater restrictions on borrowing, and greater insistence
on repayment of loans once the Fund has expired in 2024.
This would mean a reversion to the prior fiscal oversight
architecture, coupled with ESM-centred loan facilities
and oversight mechanisms for emergencies that EMU
inherited before the crisis started. Changes are made in
an incremental fashion (Jones et al., 2016).
While the positions of France andGermany appeared
deadlocked even in the early days of the Great Lockdown
imposed by Covid-19, by June of 2020, the two coun-
tries had united on a temporary, but financially signifi-
cant fund for the EU as a whole that some would like to
see evolve into a more permanent set of fiscal transfers
within the EU. However, there are clear signs that future
German governments seek to return to the pre-Covid-19
architecture that reinforces norms of national fiscal
responsibility and budget retrenchment, with the ESMas
the lender of last resort (Rehm, 2021; Zagermann, 2021)
rather than the EU, given the Commission’s reluctance to
enforce fiscal policy rules (Sacher, 2021). While an exten-
sion or expansion of the Rescue Plan and the principle
of transfers cannot be ruled out, much as the European
Financial Stability Facility became the ESM to combat
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long-term financial market speculation against the bor-
rowing capacity of individualmember states, negotiation
will not be easy, and the prospects for a Hamiltonian
moment based on mutual debt and transfers should be
measured with caution.
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